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Abstract  
In many Sub Saharan Africa countries, access to electricity to electricity is very low in rural 
areas.  For example in Ghana only 27% of rural households have access.  However, extending 
the grid in these countries faces significant technical and financial constraints and many see 
decentralised systems particularly those using renewable energy as being enormously 
important.  This presupposes the adoption of standalone technologies by a large number of 
poor farm households who are currently off-grid is likely.  However, such households in 
LDCs typically face a range of market imperfections in credit, product and other markets.  
This paper explores the potential value of access to electricity for poor agricultural 
households and the extent to which credit and output market imperfections may inhibit the 
uptake of stand-alone solar panels using a life cycle farm household simulation model which 
allows for credit constraints and yield risk.   
 
 
 
Introduction  
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010), over 1.6 billion of the world’s 
population mostly living in rural regions of developing countries have no access to electricity. 
Access to electricity has been shown to have significant benefits for rural inhabitants.  At a 
household level, the value of access to electricity to the household is derived from a number 
of sources.  The consumption of goods and services which are not possible without access to 
electricity provide direct utility, e.g. electric light, mobile phones, plus indirect potential 
health benefits.  There are also impacts on human capital which may improve labour 
productivity in the long run, e.g. via extended study and work hours due to the availability of 
electric light.  On the farm there are potential effects with at least some evidence that access 
to electricity improves productivity and may, via improved communication through mobile 
phone use, reduce farm gate price dispersion and hence improve overall farm household 
welfare (Barnes, Peskin, and Fitzgerald 2003;Khandker 1996).   
 
In many Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, access to electricity to electricity is very low in 
rural areas (Parshall et al. 2009).  For example in Ghana only 27% of rural households have 
access to electricity (GSS 2008).  However, extending the grid in these countries faces 
significant technical constraints (e.g. insufficient grid generation capacity, geographic 
barriers to grid extensions, etc); and economic constraints (e.g. the economics of supply for 
sparsely populated and remotely located settlements given Government Budget restrictions).   
Hence, in the short to medium term the only realistic path is to extend the grid to only a 
subset of currently un-electrified rural settlements.  For the remainder of settlements, many 
see decentralised systems and particularly those using renewable energy such as solar, wind, 
etc as being enormously important.  Indeed, the evidence on the optimal balance between grid 
extension and off-grid solutions using renewable resources suggests that these latter could 
and should play an important role in access to electricity for SSA particularly where the price 
of such systems is continuing to fall (Deichmann et al, 2011).  For example, recent research 
on Ghana shows that small household systems consisting of a solar panel PV plus battery 
would provide a cost effective solution to extending universal electrification for at least a 
million households (Abdul-Salam and Phimister, 2013).   
 
While useful, such planning exercises presuppose adoption by households who are currently 
off-grid is straightforward.  However, while grid extension is funded by central government, 
improving standalone access to electricity requires purchase and adoption of a capital 
intensive system by many poor (typically agricultural) households.  However, as is well 
known poor agricultural households in LDCs typically face high levels of uncertainty as well 
as range of other market imperfections in credit, product and other markets which may 
impact negatively on their ability to invest (Fafchamps, 2003, Ray, 1998).  Indeed Martinot et 
al (2001) argue that the slow rate of adoption of renewable energy technology in SSA 
countries is in part due to risk, transactions costs not observable in market prices and access 
to credit difficulties.   
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the potential value of access to electricity for poor 
agricultural households and the extent to which credit and output market imperfections may 
inhibit the uptake of stand-alone solar panels by these households.  In order to explore these 
effects a life cycle farm household model has been constructed which allows for positive 
welfare effects of access to electricity arising from improved farm productivity effects. 
Simulations from the model provide some initial quantification of the likely effect of market 
imperfections (credit constraint and risk), on stand-alone solar power investment by 
agricultural households.  
 
Farm Household Model  
Problem Structure  
The starting point for the exploration of the impact of access to electricity on farm household 
welfare is a infinite horizon model allowing for agricultural and home electricity production, 
restrictions on borrowing, and yield risk.  The approach is consistent with many models of 
this type in the literature, e.g. Phimister (1996, 1993), Singh et al (1986).  
Small standalone systems are inadequate for motorised power on the agricultural holding.  
However, access to power also allows access to ICT which reduces price search costs and 
improves coordination and managerial control.  There is now a body of evidence which 
support the view that ICT facilitated by access to electricity can have significant positive 
impacts on profits for small producers such as fishermen and farmers.  For example, Aker 
(2008) found in Niger that mobile phones have an impact on price dispersion particularly 
where travel costs are high, while Overa (2006) showed evidence in Ghana of mobile phones 
helping reduce farmer’s costs and increasing effectiveness of trade networks. Muto and 
Yamano (2008) found that mobile phone use in Uganda enabled higher market participation 
by small rural farmers producing perishable crops, while de Silva and Ratnadiwakara (2008) 
show that mobile phones significantly helped gherkin farmers in Sri Lanka reduce waste.  
Similarly Jensen (2007) found that the adoption of mobile phones decreased price dispersion 
and wastage by enabling the spread of information for Kerari fishermen in India, which made 
markets more efficient and enhanced both consumer and producer welfare.  
 
To capture the income-enhancing potential effects of access to electricity on farm 
productivity, it is assumed here that the farm household’s production is determined by a 
strictly concave function, ( , )f K e  defined increasingly over capital ( K ) and electricity used 
in farm production  e . The transmission mechanism for increasing  .f  due to  e   is the 
improved access to ICT and its accompanying channels for increased productivity.  In 
addition, to capture the impact of access to electricity (used interchangeably with access to 
ICT) on farm income-uncertainty, we assume that probability distribution of the shocks to 
agricultural production  D  is a function of the level of solar PV capital stock present on 
the farm D. This effect is specified by decreasing the variance of  D for higher stocks of 
panel capital .D  We assume that shocks impact on production in a multiplicative way as 
follows  . , .f K e  The production function for electricity  g D is naturally a function of 
the stock of solar capital .D   The household’s endogenously determined allocation of 
electricity for farm production  e  and for off-farm sale  s  is constrained by this function. 
At first glance allowing for sales of electricity for a household which is off-grid appears 
contradictory.  However, evidence suggests that limited local markets for electricity services 
from off-grid electricity generation exist.  For example, Barua (2010) describes case studies 
where rural households have invested in solar PV system and sold power to neighbours. 
 
The problem can be naturally formulated as an infinite horizon dynamic programming 
problem, with three state variables capturing the household liquid asset level ,A  its level of 
solar capital stock ,D  and the shock to agricultural production .  The decision problem is 
equivalent to an optimal replacement problem where the household wishes to maximize 
expected utility over a time additive utility function with a strictly concave subutility 
function,  .u , defined over general consumption ( C ) for each period.   Credit market 
imperfections are captured in the model by restricting possible asset values 'A  to the set of 
non-negative real numbers i.e. .A R   
 
At the beginning of each period, the household must decide on how much of its available 
liquid asset A  to spend on general consumption C  and whether to invest in a new solar 
panel  b  or wait/postpone investment  .i  The household period-beginning decision set 
, ,C b i  is constrained by the its period-beginning liquid asset A  so that a decision set  ,C b  is 
constrained by d newA C p D   whereas a decision set  ,C i  is constrained by .A C  If the 
household invests  b , its available stock of panel capital for the current period immediately 
updates to newD D .  The new panel newD  generates current period electricity production 
 newg D  which is used in farm production  e  and off-farm sale  .s  On the other hand, if 
the household decides to postpone investment in the current period  i , only the period-
beginning stock of panel capital D  would be available for use within the period. We allow 
for depreciation in our model so that the transition equations for stock of panel capital are 
 ' 1 * newD D   and  ' 1 *D D  respectively for an investment decision  b  and a 
decision to postpone  i .  
 
The household reaches a decision on b  or i  by comparing the maximum attainable utility 
from purchase  , ,bV A D   with that from waiting  , , .iV A D   The full model can be 
written as follows; 
 
      , , max , , , , ,b iV A D V A D V A D      (1) 
 
where / /b iV V V  are the overall value function, the value function associated with panel 
purchase and the value function associated with not purchasing (i.e. inaction) respectively. A 
decision to purchase a new panel decomposes the household’s optimisation problem into the 
following value function and transition equations; 
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where the general consumption price is normalized to one, with , , ,y s dp p p  defined as prices 
for output, electricity, and Solar PV investment respectively, while r is the exogenous interest 
rate. We assume in the above formulation that farm capital K  is fixed.   
 
If the household decides to postpone investment in the current period, its value function and 
transition equations are defined as follows; 
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Notice that a decision not to invest whilst relaxing the current budget constraint through 
decreased expenditure would however constrain the amount of electricity produced  .g  and 
would also lead to a greater income uncertainty due to increased variance in the distribution 
of productivity shock for the next period ' | '.D  
 
Model Solution   
 
Dynamic programming problems of this type generally do not have tractable closed form 
solutions. Hence a number of numerical techniques could be used to approximate the 
solutions of these problems, e.g. value function, policy function iteration, projection methods 
etc.  As is well known any discrete infinite horizon dynamic programming problem may be 
formulated as a linear programme.  Hence following Puterman (1994), we use approximate 
linear programming (ALP) to solve the problem numerically.  The ALP formulation for the 
model (1)-(3) is as follows; 
 
   
     
 
 
 
 
max * , , , , / ,
 
', ', ', , / , ', ', ' | , , , , / , * , , , , / ,
, , , , / , 0     ;  
, , , , , 0      
, , , , , 0      
, , , , / , 0 
t a
a t a
D new
u C x A D C b i e
such that
x A D C b i e p A D A D C b i e x A D C b i e
x A D C b i e a A t T
x A D C b e A C p D
x A D C i e A C
x A D C b i e

     




 
   
   
  


 
 
 
 
     
, ,
, / ,
e s g D
t A D
a C b i e

  


(4) 
 .x  is the endogenously determined policy function such that  . 0x   implies action set a 
is optimal for a household in state state set .t   .x  equates to zero for all infeasible or 
suboptimal state and action set combinations. The attraction of ALP arises from the ease of 
imposing constraints using  .x  as above.  is an arbitrary positive constant and   is the 
discount rate.  .p  is the transition probability matrix of moving from current period state set  
 , ,A D   to next period state set  ', ', 'A D    given that action set , / ,C b i e  is taken in the 
current period. In our model, the transition matrix  .p  is controlled by the probability 
distribution of the shock factor  .D   
 
Model Initialisation 
In the current version the model has been initialized using “reasonable” values plus parameter 
estimates from the wider literature.  By definition this implies that the results obtained are at 
this stage only indicative.  The state and action spaces in the model are initialised as follows; 
Table 1:Base Model Initialisation 
State and Action spaces Grid size Range of values 
A  60 0.1 – 3.0 
D  20 0.0 – 1.0 
  5 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 
C  40 0.1 – 3.0 
/i b  2 0,1 
e  10 0.0 – 1.0 
   
 Table 1 above shows how risk is captured in our model via the state space .  The shock to 
farm production ranges from 0.0 implying a full loss in all farm income to 2.0 implying a 
doubling of the household farm income relative to the average.  
By definition the grid approximations mean that state and action spaces are restricted to a 
limited set of values. The size of the grids determines the degree of approximation in the 
model solution. The larger the grid, the more accurate the solutions obtained. There is 
however a trade-off between large grids, model dimensions and computer resource demand 
due to the curse of dimensionality.  For example, with a problem of N  state variables with 
each state variable discretised into sn  grid points, the value function has to be evaluated by 
snN  points (Adda and Cooper, 2003).  Thus the problem size increases exponentially in grid 
points.
1
   Given the coarseness of the action grid, C , /b i  and e , the optimal policy functions 
which result are likely to be non-smooth.  Finally, the following model parameters were 
initialised as follows; 
 
Table 2: Benchmark parameters for model 
Parameter  Function Benchmark value 
Risk aversion,    CRRA Utility function,  .u  2.00 
Output elasticity of capital   CRS Cobb-Douglas Production 
function,  .f  
0.60 
Rate of time preference,    … 0.15 
Rate of depreciation,    … 0.05 
Interest rate, r   … 0.10 
Farm capital, K    .f  1.00 
Available new panel size … 1.00 
 
 
Results  
The solution to the dynamic programme (1.1-1.3) provides a set of optimal policy functions 
for consumption, investment and allocation of electricity in farm production. These policy 
functions are defined for all possible values of household liquid asset A , solar PV capital 
stock D  and productivity shock . We are most interested in the optimal consumption 
function  * 1 , ,C h A D   and investment function  
*
2 , ,I h A D  .  Investigating the nature 
of these functions provides insights into the potential impact of market imperfections (i.e. 
lack of access to credit) and risk on solar PV adoption decisions.   
                                                          
1
 For the above grid sizes, our model takes up 4GB of a quad-core computer memory and takes an hour and half to run. 
As a base comparator Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption policies of the farm household 
for all points on the liquid asset state-grid and for given points on the stock of panel capital 
state-grid when there is no uncertainty ( 1.00   in all states) in the farm production process.  
It is useful to concentrate on the extreme values of solar panel capital, i.e. when the 
household owns a new panel (panel capital equals one) or when the household does not own a 
panel (panel capital equals zero).  When the household has a new panel (as shown in the 
upper line) the household consumes all its current assets (cash) when current assets are less 
than or equal to approximately 1.0.  This is represented by the 45 degree line up to this point.  
In contrast, when the panel capital is zero, household consumption equals current assets 
(cash) up to around 0.25.  This result is as expected; the higher the available stock of panel 
capital the household owns, the greater its future income generation possibilities hence its 
willingness to exhaust more of its assets in lower cash states. Beyond the 45-degree line and 
further along the cash axis, the household saves a portion of current assets. The act of saving 
is represented in the figure by the fact that consumption is lower than the 45-degree line.  A 
household with no panel capital therefore starts saving at lower cash states (just above
0.25A ) than a household with high panel capital (just above 1.0A  ). As there is no 
uncertainty in this version of the model, savings in this context is only for purposes of 
purchasing (or replacing) a solar panel.  The propensity to save at much lower current 
asset/cash levels for households with no panel capital reflects their desire to accumulate 
savings for panel investment while attaining reasonable amounts of current consumption.  
Somewhat puzzlingly, the household consumption policy away from the 45 degree line is not 
monotonic but spiky.  Whilst the downward spikes for example may represent actual 
decreases in consumption for savings or investment, they may also in part be explained by the 
constraints imposed implicitly by the fact that the solution is restricted to a grid of discrete 
values. At higher current asset levels for both cases we observe consumption markedly rising.  
This observation is more prominent for the case where the household has no stock of panel 
capital at all. To understand this effect better, we need to generate the household’s associated 
savings and investment functions for this case.  
  
Figure 1 Optimal Consumption No Risk 
 
Figure 2 below shows the consumption function, plus associated investment and savings 
functions for a household with no stock of panel capital. Notice that investment is only made 
at sufficiently large levels of current assets/cash. The reason for the sudden and significant 
increase in consumption as mentioned above is more apparent in this Figure. When the 
household has sufficiently high current assets/cash it makes an investment in a new panel. 
Figure 3 is a 3D investment function of the household showing the optimal invest/postpone 
decision for all possible combinations of liquid asset A  and stock of liquid capital .D   It 
shows that the maximum level of panel capital at which the household is willing to replace is 
about 0.58.D    
Figure 2: Consumption, Savings and Investment functions for Households without Solar 
PV  
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Figure 3: Solar Panel Investment Region – No Risk 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the impact of different shocks to the analysis.  For a household with no stock 
of panel capital D , the propensity to invest in a new panel at the beginning of a farming 
period is significantly affected by the size of the shock   observed for that period. If the 
period beginning observed shock is sufficiently low, the household’s propensity for 
investment is significantly higher than when the observed period beginning shock is high. In 
panel 1 of Figure 4 where the observed shock is unfavourable  0.0  , the household invests 
in a new panel when cash of up to about 2.1 is available. In the third panel where observed 
shock is highly favourable however  2.0  , the household is only willing to invest in a new 
panel if cash available at the beginning of the farming period is markedly higher at about 2.7.  
Indeed, generally is a tendency to consume more in high shock periods rather than save or 
invest.  These observations are consistent with fact that household has rational expectations 
about future shocks and therefore consider positive and negative shocks as transitory, 
although the probability of future shocks is conditions by the level the household panel 
capital D through the distribution  .D      
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Figure 4 Impact of Risk on Investment Region 
 
Figure 5 captures in 3D the investment function of the household for all possible 
combinations of liquid asset A , stock of durable capital D  and select shock values  . The 
effect of risk on the household propensity to invest is revealed in this figure. As was 
discussed above, the threshold for investment takes place at higher cash levels for high shock 
periods than for low shock periods. Interestingly however, Figure 5 also reveals a different 
aspect to the conditions for investment relative to the household’s stock of panel capital. It is 
observed that in high shock regimes, households are more willing to replace panels of higher 
stock value than in low shock regimes. For example, in panel 1 (low shock regime), the 
maximum stock of panel capital the household would replace is about 0.6D  . In contrast, 
the maximum level of panel stock the household is willing to replace in panel 3 (high shock 
regime) is much higher i.e. about 0.7D  .  
Figure 5:  Effect of Risk on Investment Region 
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The implications of uncertainty on household consumption, investment and savings as 
discussed above may also be analysed using simulations. Whilst policy functions might be 
identical for some combinations of states, simulations may reveal not so obvious household 
behaviour. To do this we use the optimal policy functions to simulate household behaviour 
under a 70-period simulation for a poor farm household (initial conditions = low cash and no 
stock of panel capital) in a risky environment.  The results of this analysis are shown in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6:  Simulated Farm Household Consumption, Investment and Savings Behaviour 
 
The bottom line show the set of shocks which were used in the simulation.  As one would 
expect these shocks are reflected in savings and cash holdings, while consumption is 
significantly smoother, although still showing some variability. Also indicated are the points 
at which the farm household invests in the solar panel.  Significantly although this happens 
on average around every 10 years,  the interval between investments is not constant.  Not 
unexpectedly the rate of savings in the period just before an investment is very high indeed, 
while the rate of saving in the period after an investment is markedly smaller, which perhaps 
captures how the lack of access to credit distorts savigns and consumption in these periods. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has explored the potential value of access to electricity for agricultural households 
and the extent to which credit and output market imperfections may inhibit the uptake of 
stand-alone solar panels by farm households.  In order to explore these effects a life cycle 
farm household model was constructed which allows for positive welfare effects of access to 
electricity arising from improved farm productivity effects.  Simulations from the model 
provide some initial quantification of the likely effect of market imperfections (credit 
constraint and risk), risk aversion and interest rate on stand-alone solar power investment by 
agricultural households and the associated household welfare effects. They show the 
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potentially large impacts which both access to credit and risk have in the optimal decision of 
poor farm households (not) to invest in solar PV. 
 
While illustrative of the trade-offs the model implemented has little empirical content.  
Improving this aspect is the focus of future work. 
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